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Introduction

International aid plays major roles in modern politics. Many in donor nations
view them as wasteful expenditures that hurt the donor nation, and others view
them as corrupt industries that do not actually aid the receiving nation (Hassan,
The State Capture Onset in Ethiopia: Humanitarian Aid and Corruption, 2013).
Substantial research has been focused on these two questions, but what about
instances of non-corruption? What are the effects of aid that reaches the intended
recipients at the desired magnitude? The Samaritan’s Dilemma, put forth by
James M. Buchanan, illustrates a relationship between a “donor” and a “parasite”
(Buchanan, 1975). In a Samaritan’s game, the donor chooses between being
charitable or not, and the parasite chooses whether to work or not. Throughout the
game, if the donor chooses to be charitable, the parasite finds it much more
advantageous to not work. This is often the statement used by those opposing
welfare, but what if we apply this to a nation or society at large? The effects of
not working at a societal level can be easily translated into a lack of industry or a
decline in industry, either by direct loss or through attrition.
The loss of industry emanates from a crowding out issue. Consider an
example in which a charity is willing to come to an area to build houses. Likely,
there is someone with the skills and ability to build houses locally; their level of
quality may be lower than the charity’s, but these local builders are capable. The
charities add an issue for local businesses: the charities will do the work for free,
or at a significantly reduced cost. Assuming the local builders were building
houses at a given rate, who are the local consumers likely to choose if the
charities arrive and are willing to build houses free or at a reduced rate?
Consumers are more than likely to choose the free or reduced option. Thus, the
local builders lose out on sales. If this trend continues, the local builders may be
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crowded out by the charities. Similarly, a business may not start up if it believes a
charity may simply show up and undercut it. Remember, this is assuming good
intentions and without corruption.
To make a blanket statement about charities is erroneous and does not
account for the distinct types of charities and aid. Infrastructure or education
based charities, such as those put forth by Wydick, et Al., show an increase in
schooling levels and salary levels in future years (Wydick, Glewwe, & Rutledge,
2013). Improved and increased education is one of the most important aspects in
improving an economy in the long-run. Their research suggests that child
sponsorship charities achieve this. Thus, not all charities limit the economic
output or potential output of an area. Similarly, infrastructure charities, e.g. those
that dig wells, likely do little harm in the way of stunting economic growth. While
there is little evidence to directly suggest this, one can surmise that, by increasing
levels of infrastructure, we can expect a decrease in transaction costs and thus an
increase in utility. All of these considerations are important when discussing the
effects of charities and aid. We must ensure our focus is on the charities that can
potentially cause harm. Thus, the charities discussed herein will be primarily
donation-based and certain serviced-based charities (i.e. charities that simply send
clothing or other miscellaneous goods, or those that travel to location and perform
a service that a local populace could do on its own).
We examine empirically the effects of how international aid impacts the
economic development of developing nations. Contrary to our initial
presumptions, we show how aid simultaneously helps and hurts local economies.
Local industries cannot compete with the lower or free cost services and goods
that charities provide and are thus crowded out. This lack of local industry results
in a lack of jobs and employment in these areas, subsequently resulting in little
salary or monetary growth. These areas, lacking an industrial base of their own,

3

cannot afford to purchase goods since they have nothing beyond an exportoriented economy, and, therefore suffer from scarcity for the goods they
themselves cannot produce. However, aid does appear to spur on the development
of infrastructure and allows for forward linkages and growth potential. Thus, aid
is a complicated tool that results in short-term losses in exchange for long-term
potential, and, since aid is not permanent, the negative effects will eventually
dissipate.

Literature Review

The theoretical framework for this issue is laid out perfectly by Calmette &
Kilkenny (Calmette & Kilkenny, 2002). They illustrate how aid, in times of
calamity or disaster, skew the incentives of the local populace. They outline that,
even in times of disaster and despite developing nations needing assistance, the
long-term effects of foreign aid involvement can often do substantial harm to the
local economy. Their research further examines the effects of situations caused by
moral hazard, incomplete information, and adverse selection. They highlight
issues of who and how much charities should help. Oftentimes, charity
involvement is necessary, but many issues, such as moral hazard or adverse
selection, make it difficult to assign aid to the correct country. They conclude that
these excess costs are borne heavily by the neediest of nations. They highlight
issues of exploitation resulting from charity involvement but also help lay some of
the framework for optimal charity involvement.
An example involves the Australian aid program, specially aid to Papua
New Guinea, Heinecke et al. is primarily an indictment of a failing aid program,
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but throughout, the article outlines the reasons for a failing program (Heinecke,
Dollery, & Fleming, 2008). Namely, they expound upon which circumstances aid
fails. Fragile states especially are subject to aid harming their growth and
development. They primarily focus on political institutions, governance
mechanisms, and issues of corruption, but they nonetheless highlight the issues
with sending large amounts of aid to fragile states. By focusing on macro-level
issues, they highlight the difference between aid being sent to fragile versus more
stable states. This difference underscores our claim that developing nations are
potentially negatively impacted by aid.
One alternative perspective is the notion put forth by Nowak-Lehmann D.
et al. (D., 2009). Their analysis pertained to both the short- and long-term effects
of aid with Germany as the donor nation and around seventy-seven recipient
nations, all primarily developing nations. They sought to answer the question of
whether aid is effective or not for the donor nation. They contradict old findings
that the benefits were large, about $4/$1 ratio of dollars earned/dollars donated.
Their empirical study resulted in a positive ratio but a much smaller magnitude,
around $1.5/$1 on the high end. Their premise is rooted in the concept that
increased aid to developing nations increases the chances that the donor nation is
the primary exporter of goods. This finding subsequently implies that by receiving
a return on donation investments, donations must be beneficial.
Since we have already discussed aid in terms of an investment (Agosin &
Machado, 2005), we now discuss foreign direct investment (FDI) in terms of its
effect on crowding out: “If FDI enters the sectors where there are competing
domestic firms, it may take away investment opportunities that were open to
domestic entrepreneurs prior to the foreign investments” (Agosin & Machado,
2005, p. 151). Their research highlights the crowding out of domestic investment
due to the large volume of FDI. They lay out the theoretical framework for
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improving FDI in order to help promote domestic investment. Similarly,
donations, aid, and charity work can result in the same issues. The purpose of FDI
is the return for the investor; for this reason, the benefits and returns of FDI may
be more to the investor than the benefits the recipient receives. Similarly, as stated
earlier, many donation groups view aid as avenues for returns at a macro-level.
For example, donating large sums may garner favor in the recipient nation, or, if
the aid is used for infrastructure, the donors may be able to capitalize upon the
increased infrastructure. Thus, it is not a far stretch to see that the issues arising
from FDI can also be created with charities in varying magnitudes. The authors
outline how, even in a best-case scenario, FDI has left the recipient nation
unchanged, whereas it is more likely it has done the developing nation harm by
stunting domestic growth. These same results were replicated and noted in
(Fahinde, Abodohoui, Mohiunddin, & Su, 2015). These authors note that various
types of investment, FDI and development assistance all negatively contribute to
growth in various countries in west Africa. Their “results show that ODA
[developmental aid] have a lasting crowding-out domestic investment” (Fahinde,
Abodohoui, Mohiunddin, & Su, 2015, p. 245). These authors then go on to show
how these countries could develop better absorption rates and should improve
technological gains, but this diverts from the scope of this discussion. Their initial
findings still speak to the issue brought forth by many of the authors above. While
crowding out is not a perfect comparison for charities, donations, and aid, we can
note the similarities in the incentives they create and the outcomes they
perpetuate. Thus, it is noteworthy to discuss them in similar context.
Beyond simply charities and aid that help during normal times, we should
also consider aid in times of natural disaster. Cohen and Werker point out that
“the addition of humanitarian aid to the model produces a bailout effect:
governments underinvest in disaster prevention when they know that they will be
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bailed out in the event of disaster” (Cohen & Werker, 2008). The issues of
governmental dependencies continue to propagate in the face of humanitarian aid.
These issues are once again on a macro-level and focus more on governmental
actions, but it does imply a long-standing issue about the dependency on foreign
aid. In fact, this relates very closely with the issue we are intending to study. A
recipient country may under-invest in disaster prevention or repair if they believe
that an international organization will step in to assist them in times of need.
Thus, the firms that could have been created in these recipient nations are not
created or are defunded. By not funding their own agencies and firms, these
recipient nations are seeing a decrease in employment and job possibilities. One
could argue that this should allow the workers who would normally be working in
disaster relief jobs to find work in a new industry. The issue here is twofold. First,
if this issue of crowding-out local industry pervades the entirety of the market,
there may not be any jobs to fill. Secondly, since many of these nations are
developing nations, there are intrinsically not many jobs to be filled. These
authors conclude that, while aid during disaster times can help smooth shocks and
prevent collapse of certain markets and areas, it also distorts incentives and may
lead to a larger disaster fallout.
While not the focus of this study, a conversation about charity actions in
developing countries could not be complete without discussing the impact of
corruption. The study by Hassan (2013) about the effects of charity and aid in
Ethiopia outlines how aid has been captured by ruling parties and rarely reaches
those in need. The scope of Hassan’s work goes beyond the intentions of our
study, but it is nonetheless important to lay out further issues regarding aid that is
not carefully considered. Throughout his work, the author points to the misuse of
aid funding by the ruling elite in order to repress and subjugate the lower classes.
This is a very common and well-reviewed area: charity corruption. This is not the
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focus of our work, and this is included to differentiate between what we are
attempting to study.
Little research has been done regarding the effects of charities on
economic development and crowding out. The issues revolving around FDI are
similar to the ones we have found regarding charities. Both FDI and charities
result in a crowding out effect that drives away and suppresses domestic
investment and growth. Thus, in order to promote domestic growth, steps need to
be taken by the international community and charities to curb unnecessary and
frivolous aid. Ultimately, the crowding out results in local areas being
uncompetitive with respect to the global market. The lack of jobs and
opportunities results in a cycle of poverty and aid that hinder any group’s rise
above it. While some articles show that aid during times of natural disasters is
beneficial in that it helps to smooth shocks to the markets, it nonetheless skews
incentives domestically. This skewing results in fewer domestic firms being hired
by the governments to prepare or repair after a disaster hits. The model laid out by
Calmette & Kilkenny illustrates optimum aid levels in order to prevent skewed
incentives in times of disaster. Our work analyzes empirically the effects of
charities in various developing nations in order to illustrate the effects of not only
Buchanan’s Samaritan’ Dilemma but also the effects of those with respect to the
aforementioned framework. We focus largely on the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia
and utilize this as a case study. By utilizing the tsunami as a natural experiment,
we can observe both time-series and cross-sectional data.
Underlying Theory and Questions

There are several effects we seek to examine. The first is moral hazard.
Oftentimes, if persons are aware of safety precautions or some form of insurance,
they take more risks than they otherwise would. The second is crowding out,
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which is often referred to with respect to interest rates and government spending.
The underlying principle behind this effect, however, is that the actions of larger
institutions, such as governments or charities, often replace the actions of private
firms and individuals. In our paper, we are examining two primary instances of
crowding out: first, the effects of foreign aid and how it distorts the incentives of
developing nations to prepare for disasters, which is also viewed as a moral
hazard; second, the hindrance on local firms post-disaster due to the large influx
of charitable actions; third, the effects of externalities regarding various regions
and the aid they receive.
We have determined four core questions that we seek to answer with our
data: do developing nations, when faced with tools to preempt natural disaster,
such as a tsunami warning, inadequately prepare due to the known existence of
foreign aid and relief? Are local firms and businesses crowded out due to
incoming relief aid? How does aid affect different regions of a nation with various
proximities to the disaster? Are there externalities?
First, we examine whether nations prepare insufficiently for disasters. This
could be viewed as a moral hazard issue; since these nations know relief aid will
come in the event of a disaster, they may choose to inadequately prepare. This is a
simplistic view, however. No doubt moral hazards such as these occur, but we are
neglecting a substantial fact: cost and amount of funding. It costs hundreds of
millions of dollars to create warning systems, and, often, many developing nations
need this funding for a myriad of other purposes. They must choose between
using this money to help prevent a high-cost but low-probability disaster or
investing in growth of their industries. The low probability of these disasters
skews the cost and, subsequently, the perceived need by these nations. Therefore,
we can see how the existence of foreign aid potentially enables these nations to
divert their scarce resources into other areas of the economy. Nations may wish to
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invest in the profitable areas and forego the less-developed regions. For example,
they may choose to improve a factory that has hundreds of jobs and is a major
exporter over protecting areas with subsistence farming.
The skewed cost of a disaster is evident in the aftermath of the 2004
Indonesian tsunami when, in 2006, they began the process to construct an early
warning system. According to Transportation Minister Hatta Radjasa, "part of the
funds will originate from the state budget and the rest from foreign aid” and the
total cost around $142 million, reported Roy Tupai (2006). Indonesia could not
shoulder the burden alone and required this foreign assistance in order to prepare.
This still puts a large burden on Indonesia. This construction occurred after the
tsunami, meaning a preemptive warning system before the 2004 tsunami would
have been harder to encourage support. One of the major issues is quantifying the
cost of a disaster. Due to the low probability and, more importantly, the fact that it
could occur nearly anywhere, significantly hinders considerations of its cost. The
public and, subsequently, the leaders, may be reluctant to spend such a large sum
for something that may not ever happen. After the event, however, the nation has
witnessed the cost and, thus, may be more inclined to prepare. Nevertheless, a
moral hazard may exist, and we seek to examine whether or not aid distorts
funding. Finally, one way our analysis on this topic would be more conclusive is
comparing two disasters in the same nation. Having seen the destruction of the
first disaster, a nation may better understand the costs and better prepare.
Ultimately, this final note is left as speculation, but, if another disaster occurs, it
could be utilized to answer many questions.
Second, are local businesses and firms crowded out by relief workers and
aid? This question is not one answered purely in terms of aid. We must examine
the impact of boots-on-ground, or actual relief workers in country. This question
can best be summed up in an anecdote. After the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia, many
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NGOs and charities came to help with disaster relief. Oftentimes, these
organizations lack manpower but have funding, thus they hire local persons and
simply direct and pay for the relief effort. In the anecdote, these NGOs paid
Western wages and attracted many individuals to them. This pulled local
individuals away from local industries. The absence of labor hurt the local firms,
and, when the NGOs left, the economy had been hurt despite the relief workers.
The anecdote is not the proof, but the inspiration for the question. We want to
examine whether this effect actually occurs. Do local firms, when faced by stiff
competition from NGOs, lose out on labor and profits, ultimately deciding to
close? By examining growth rates before and after disasters we can view the
variations in trends of job growth.
Lastly, how do these and other effects impact various regions in a nation?
Specifically, we want to examine areas affected by the disaster and compare them
to nearby and more remote regions. Utilizing this data, we can control for various
national policies that could potentially confound our results, but we can also
measure effects of spillovers. By observing these differences, we can potentially
observe cross-region crowding out, where businesses in regions unaffected by the
disaster still lose business to NGOs and charities. This will also allow us to
observe whether the effects of aid are localized or if they have national benefits or
detriments. For example, does improving infrastructure is the disaster zone have a
positive externality to nearby regions? These spillover effects can lead to more
long-term growth in a nation despite the disaster.
Ultimately, we want to examine relief and foreign aid surrounding various
natural disasters. We want to examine the potential moral hazard of over-relying
on aid, inadequate disaster preparedness, crowding out of local firms by
international organizations and charities, and whether there are any externalities,
or spillover, for non-effected regions. By answering these questions, we can arrive
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at a comprehensive view of aid and its effects. This data could then be useful in
calculating appropriate aid measurements or styles; by improving the efficiency of
aid, we can increase the welfare of a nation without exacerbating any latent
issues.
Methods and Analysis

Our analysis focuses largely on Indonesia due to the large amount of data
available. By utilizing the 2004 tsunami as an event study, we can examine the
various regions affected and unaffected, both before and after the event, in order
to obtain a more holistic view of the disaster and aid. While our initial desire was
to include various nations and disasters, the limited availability of data has
restricted our study to only Indonesia. Nevertheless, the dataset we have for
Indonesia is very thorough. We have over 200 variables for the nearly 550
districts in Indonesia. With this level of data, we thought it best to focus our
efforts in order to understand it in more depth. The granularity of this data allows
us to examine the local effects of the tsunami and aid on more than national-level
data would allow. We have defined minor impact districts as those districts either
adjacent to a major impact district or in line with the Tsunami, but at a greater
distance. This description is somewhat loose with regard to damage, but it allows
us to differentiate between nearby regions and regions on the other side of
Indonesia. While the effects of disaster and aid may be catastrophic, it may only
marginally affect a nation at large but be devastating to a local populace.
Therefore, by utilizing this data over some other nations we examined, we
believed we could get to the root of the issue and avoid any unnecessary noise.
We first began breaking down the data by category, such as poverty rate or
unemployment figures, and by three different years. The tsunami occurred on
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26th of December 2004, thus, we selected the years of 2003, 2006, and 2011. By
selecting years both before and several years after, we can gauge long-term trend
changes in various economic variables; also, by selecting 2006, we can observe
the effects of the vast amounts of aid that come in. The categories we selected are
largely based upon the availability of data, as a substantial amount of data was not
recorded in 2003 or 2006. Nevertheless, by utilizing infrastructure expenditure
and various GDP expenditures, we can observe various conditions and situations.
We also assigned dummy variables for the years and whether the area experienced
a major impact, a minor impact, or no impact at all. All of the economic data was
gathered through the World Bank and its various databases. Utilizing all of these
variables, we have arrived at some interesting results to answer our
aforementioned questions.
Lastly, there are some limitations in the data that we have. Due to lack of
aid data at the regional level and the lack of aggregated charitable aid in both
monetary and humanitarian forms, we must tread carefully in reaching our
conclusions. The aid data that we have is for national levels only. We were unable
to find these values for provincial or regional levels and had to simply resort to
national level data. For this reason, examining a cross-section of a specific year is
difficult and potentially deceiving. We attempted to compensate for the limitation
by assigning the same aid level to each region. We chose this option since the
changes in aid were the important aspects of the data. When examining one year
alone, however, we have no change in this variable and, thus, the calculations
return an error. Also, when examining time-series data, this variable is more
accurate but creates an endogeneity issue, since areas with higher poverty are
likely to receive higher levels of aid, for instance. We have attempted to mediate
this problem by lagging the aid received by a year, due to the natural lag of
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receiving money before actions and repairs actually occur. This does not remove
the endogeneity issue entirely, but it does help to mitigate it.
In terms of non-monetary aid, finding data for this from a myriad of
sources, such as charities and church groups, would be nearly impossible. For this
reason, due to the nature of a natural disaster and the aid it will encourage, we
assume that the aid data we have acts as a signaling tool for non-monetary aid.
Vast swaths of aid were donated, and many organizations sent workers to help
with the disaster. For this reason, we can safely assume that both monetary and
non-monetary aid increased and decreased at roughly similar rates. Working from
these assumptions and compensations, we begin analyzing our data and our
questions.
Finally, for various economic figures, such as unemployment and labor
information, most regions in Indonesia did not begin recording these figures until
2007. For this reason, the first two years we have selected, 2003 and 2006, do not
contain any of these figures. We have attempted to compensate for this
shortcoming by utilizing the available figures and attempting to find a correlation
between the labor figures in 2011 and other variables that are also available in
2003 and 2006. By repeatedly utilizing these variables, we hope to use them as
signals to compensate for the lack of labor figures in the 2003 and 2006 time sets;
in other words, we are attempting to find an instrumental variable. For example,
various GDP expenditures, which are available in 2003 and 2006, also strongly
correlate with unemployment in the 2011 set. For this reason, we use these GDP
expenditures as a rough tool to somewhat show changes in unemployment, even
when the actual unemployment figures are not available.
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Moral Hazard

The first question we sought to answer was whether governments under-prepare
for natural disaster due to known existence of foreign aid. We began examining
this by focusing on 2003, since this was before the disaster, and observing the
amount spent on infrastructure and the GDP expenditure on construction. We
focus on these variables primarily due to their intrinsic nature toward lasting
investments, such as buildings and infrastructure. Typically, in order to make a
building or an infrastructure system disaster resistant, the cost is quite high. For
this reason, we should expect both variables to be higher. Since these variables
represent a nation’s or region’s expenditure on buildings and infrastructure, if
they are markedly high, then we would assume that a substantial amount of funds
is being supplied to not just construct areas, but construct them well. This could
also account for areas of large growth, which is why we have utilized other
expenditure types as control variables.
One limitation of the data is evident: since aid data is not at the regional
level like the rest of the economic data, we are unable to utilize it as a variable in
our regression. However, we have attempted to compensate for this issue by
examining the infrastructure and construction expenditure in 2003 on the various
districts. We are unable to ascertain whether aid has any direct impact, but the
data does seem to imply a different answer altogether. Our regressions actually
seem to imply that the region’s proximity to the disaster mattered very little in
terms of infrastructure and construction expenditure. Instead, we found that it is
the economic strength of the region that influences the expenditure amount. In
other words, the only thing that significantly affected the expenditure amounts
was the wealth of region and how developed it was (see in Table 1).
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This shows that nations choose to build up areas that have higher
economic value and forego areas with less. This makes sense, as a developed
region has positive externalities for the entire nation. It provides jobs and goods to
export, attracts investors, increase tax revenue, and brings a myriad of other
positive effects. An impoverished area, on the other hand, struggles to sustain
itself, and brings little in terms of national improvement. Thus, when faced with
limited resources and being able to only protect one region, nations will choose
the developed one, as it provides a greater return for the nation. Similar to how
one cares little about planning for retirement if one is struggling to make ends
meet in the present, impoverished areas have little to protect that will yield a
national return. Nations may be less inclined to prepare for disasters in areas that
hold little value. They may instead focus their funding and preparation on areas
that hold a strong economic value.
This conclusion is more of an educated inference, however, due to the
obvious endogeneity issue of high-income areas and more infrastructure spending.
The high-income areas are growing and expanding much quicker than others and
have a substantial incentive for further expansion, whereas lower income areas
will inherently receive less. This is in terms of raw infrastructure expenditure,
completely irrelevant of disasters. For this reason, however, we can somewhat
extend the logic to disaster situations. Nations do not expressly underprepare
because of foreign aid; they merely prepare certain areas more than others based
upon the value of that region. One final impact of this decision-making process is
the mostly inherent randomness of natural disasters. While some areas are
marginally more at risk than others, any coastal region is at risk overall of a
similar disaster. Hence, since nations cannot feasibly prepare all regions, they
must prioritize which regions are more important.
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Foreign aid may play a role in their decision, though. Due to the existence
of foreign aid, they may choose to not invest in poorer areas and instead use their
finite resources to expand and protect areas of much more importance. Thus, aid
may actually encourage nations to expand their growth in their best and
burgeoning sectors and get more of a national return than if they had spent this
preparing a poorer sector. Ultimately, aid allows nations to redirect their funds
toward districts that will have higher economic return due to the comfort that aid
will be provided to the poorer areas in the event of a disaster.
Crowding Out

The second question we sought to answer was whether aid, both workers and
funding, crowds out local workers, business, and investment. We first began by
examining the poverty rate. We spoke about the endogeneity issue early, but,
nonetheless, the results are noteworthy. As one can observe on Table 2, noting the
potential endogeneity issues, we see that overall aid tends to correlate with high
poverty rates and, as expectantly, those areas hardest hit by the tsunami also
exhibit higher levels of post-disaster poverty. Even when controlling for regional
variations of wealth, such as household expenditure and GDP expenditure rates,
we still note an increase in poverty with response to aid. Not included below, due
to not being statistically significant, our regressions show that, by 2011, the
hardest hit areas exhibit a reduction in poverty, but again, this was not significant.
We assume here that aid is going to the hardest hit districts. Since this is where
the most damage occurred, it makes sense the charity groups and other types of
aid would prioritize these regions over others. For this reason, we expect the
effects of aid on majorly impacted districts to be much greater than any other
region. One final note to keep in mind is that we have lagged our aid data. The aid
data that is being tested is one year before the other economic figures. This helps
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to somewhat mediate the endogeneity issue, since the aid influx occurred before
the changes in poverty that we are testing.
Second, as you can observe from Table 3, when we restrict the regression
to non-majorly effected areas, we still note an increase in the poverty rate. This
restriction allows us to rule out part of the endogeneity issue brought about by the
aid data. We can assume that a vast majority of aid went to the majorly effected
regions, and yet the aid that did go to other regions still has a negative impact. For
every one percent increase in aid, we note a (.6) percent increase in poverty.
Utilizing these statistics, we can observe how increases in aid actually appear to
do some harm to jobs over time. We also note that various independent variables
in the above regressions also correlate strongly with unemployment rates.
However, this view is not comprehensive. One consistent theme
throughout every single regression and analysis we performed is that electricity
rates always correlate very strongly and positively with growth indicators. Thus,
when we observe Table 4, we can see that, over time, electricity rates in effected
areas trends upward. Looking only at the time variable is misleading. Noting the
2011 coefficients on both major and minor impact districts, we note that both of
these points express an increase. This implies that, over time, since these are the
areas that likely received the most in foreign aid, these districts have seen a
marked increase in electricity rates. As stated, electricity rates correlate strongly
with growth indicators. Therefore, we should see that growth should be occurring
in these areas since, by 2011, both levels grow well beyond their initial points.
Therefore, combining the results of the above reports, we note that aid
helps in certain ways but hurts in other. Aid does appear to crowd out workers and
business, hindering investment, savings, and monetary growth. This ultimately
leads to higher levels of poverty and an increasing poverty gap. At the same time,
aid also helps rebuild vital infrastructure and bring electricity and clean water to
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not only the areas that lost it but also to new areas. Contrary to our initial
presumptions, aid does appear to hurt in the short run, but help in the long run. By
helping to rebuild infrastructure and bring it to new areas, new forward linkages
are investments that encourage future growth and development. They
unfortunately do this by forgoing backward linkages. By utilizing foreign aid and
workers, an influx of aid displaces a myriad of workers and hinders labor growth,
thereby hurting the regions in the short term. Ultimately, to observe the long-term
results, we would require more data, many years beyond that which we have.
Nevertheless, it is hopeful to see that aid does indeed appear to help in the longrun.

Spillovers and Externalities

Rarely does an event only affect those directly involved. Oftentimes, we have
repercussions and consequences that effect those nearby. This concept is also
applicable to disasters and the recovery. The damage done to the roads in one area
may hinder travel through that region and ultimately hurt the economy of a region
unaffected by the disaster, for example. Alternatively, creating new infrastructure
may encourage new developments in nearby regions due to a greater accessibility.
In order to observe this effect, we refer back to tables 2 and 3. Table 3
restricts the regression to only minor impact and no impact regions, and the major
impact regions are excluded. This allows us to observe the areas that likely did
not receive the bulk of the aid. As we can see from above, aid still appears to
correlate with poorer regions. While the endogeneity issue is still present, it is less
noticeable here. In the previous crowding out discussion, due to the limitations of
data and since we were discussing the hardest hit regions, confounding results are
borne likely due to aid going to areas that were hardest hit and needed the relief

19

the most. In this instance, however, the areas in question were not badly damaged
and suffered far less than the majorly effected regions. For this reason, the
endogeneity issue somewhat diminishes. Since the hardest hit regions likely
received the most aid, the minor impact districts likely received very little in
relative terms. With this consideration noted, by observing Table 3, we still see
the positive correlation between aid and poverty rates.
This suggests that the aid spillover effects are also positive, but small.
While we discussed earlier that aid hurts the majorly affected regions in the short
term, it ultimately creates forward linkages and promoting future growth. A
similar story can be told for the minor impact districts. When observing Table 3,
we note an increase in poverty. However, when observing Table 5, we note a
positive, yet insignificant, correlation between aid and electricity rates in minor
impact and no impact districts. However, we note a substantially positive and
significant growth in minor impact districts in 2011 relative to earlier years.
Observing the coefficient on minor impact, we note that in 2003 and 2006, minor
impact districts were much lower than unaffected districts. Yet, once the aid has
been distributed and utilized, i.e. in 2011, we note a substantial growth of
electricity rates in minor impact districts. The issue is whether this was purely a
result of aid or if some other factors were at play. For this reason, it is safer to
state that the spillover effects appear to emulate that of the crowding out question
above. We note an increase in poverty rates with the influx of aid, but also appear
to have an increase in electricity rates, leading to forward linkages and the
potential for growth; however, due to the limitations of the data, we cannot
attribute aid as the key factor here.
In terms of the fidelity and consistency with our data, we performed a few
various actions to test for any issues. First, we performed heteroskedasticity tests
for each regression output, and the results were consistent with all of those below.
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Since the Huber-White outputs were very similar to our findings, we have elected
to not include them. Similarly, we used a correlation matrix with the major
variables that were used, and it displayed some collinearity between a few
variables. Thus, we re-ran the regressions with one removed, but the results were
once again very similar. Throughout both tests the coefficients never changed, the
R-squared values remained roughly the same, and the T-statistic also remained
roughly the same. Thus, we feel confident in the consistency with our results.

Results

Contrary to our initial presumptions, aid does appear to promote long-growth and
development. When examining our three issues, each time we arrive at a
somewhat unexpected conclusion. As we stated earlier, we anticipated that aid
would displace workers and local business by crowding out their potential. We
approached this by using aid data as a signaling tool around the 2004 tsunami. As
we have stated also, there are limitations in the data. First and foremost, we have
neither the numbers for charity involvement, nor the figures for non-monetary aid.
We have attempted to compensate for this by utilizing foreign developmental aid
as a signaling tool. Secondly, the aid data that we have is only at the national
level, whereas the rest of economic data is at the provincial level. This creates
some issues when running regressions and drawing conclusions from them. Since
we cannot know where the aid went, we must assume that a majority of aid went
to the hardest hit areas. While this is a limitation, this assumption we make is not
unreasonable. Despite some of these drawbacks, we have nonetheless arrived at
some interesting conclusions.
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With regard to the moral hazard question, it appears that nations do not
underprepare for disasters so much as they only prepare those areas that are
important. By observing the amount of funding toward infrastructure and
construction, the most important expenditures for minimizing the damage from
disasters, we observe that the funding amounts had no relation to the magnitude of
the impact of the disaster. Since each region has arguably the chance of being hit
by a disaster, we observe that areas with higher levels of development are the
ones being prepared for disasters. There are two important considerations to note
here. One is an endogeneity issue brought about by the expenditures. Areas with
higher levels of development almost always have higher infrastructure
expenditure. Regardless of the level of risk a region is for disaster, we often
observe wealthier areas getting more development.
Secondly, an inherent part of infrastructure development is ensuring that it
is resistant to disaster. Since making resilient infrastructure costs more than
poorly constructed infrastructure, we can conceptualize resilient infrastructure is a
normal good. Therefore, the wealthier areas may spend more on infrastructure
because of the growing demand for it. By the same token, they are likely
developing it to be resilient since they are wealthier. Hence, despite the former
issue of endogeneity, we can still draw conclusions from what we have available.
With all of these considerations, we have arrived at the conclusion that
governments do not underprepare for disasters because of foreign aid; they
instead focus their limited resources on the areas that have the highest economic
return. They continually invest and secure the areas that benefit the nation.
Furthermore, foreign aid likely does play a role in reinforcing this behavior, but it
is a good thing. Since resources are scarce, a nation can spend its money on
expanding and protecting a wealthy area that ultimately benefits the whole nation
or spend its money protecting an area of the nation that brings little benefit and

22

directing funds away from the wealthier areas. Foreign aid allows nations to focus
more heavily on the more developed regions, and, as these regions grow, they will
benefit the nation as a whole.
With regard to the crowding out issue, it appears that aid may hurt in the
short-run but does appear to help in the long-run. From our results above, we note
that aid appears to correlate with higher levels of poverty, regardless of magnitude
of impact. As we have stated, there is the issue of endogeneity, which is why we
cannot state the part above with certainty. For example, if a business owner lost
his house and business, he probably will care more about his house than the
profits of his business. Due to this inherent limitation, we cannot draw any
substantial conclusions from aid and the poverty amounts. If we had regional aid
levels of data, we could observe the effects of aid on areas that were not hit by the
tsunami and see if they had any crowding out; however, we do not have that data.
Nevertheless, we were able to find some interesting results from the data.
We note a significant and positive correlation with aid and electricity rates.
Throughout a myriad of regressions, electricity rates have always correlated with
higher levels of development. Thus, we observe that aid data and workers are
making substantial repairs and developments in infrastructure. This is typically
one of the goals of aid, so it is encouraging to see that it correlates. In terms of
development and growth, this is imperative. Increases in infrastructure create
forward linkages that not only assists those present but also encourages new
business and persons to enter the area. Hence, aid appears to not only repair the
infrastructure in an area but also brings more than was there before the disaster,
subsequently preparing areas for substantial future growth. Combining both
factors above, we note that aid creates forward linkages at the expense of
backward linkages. Aid improves the infrastructure of areas, but does so without
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spurring local workers and builders to be the ones to improve it. This is consistent
with the work of James Buchanan (1975), the findings by Agosin & Machado
(2005), and the results from Fahinde et al. (2015).
Lastly, with regards to the spillover effects, we note a similar trend as the
crowding out issue above. Throughout our regressions, we note almost an
identical trend as the one above. This is partially due to the limitations of the data,
resulting in the same confounding variation as above. This aspect is one of the
weakest in terms of correlation. Nevertheless, we do note a slightly positive
correlation between aid and electricity rates in non-major impact districts. This
could partially be explained due to how infrastructure is designed. For example,
repairing and improving the electricity lines in only one district does little good
unless one repairs all of the lines back to the power plant. Thus, we should see
more comprehensive improvement. Ultimately, without regional aid data, this
question is even harder to answer than the former.
Conclusion

Ultimately, we do note a positive impact between aid and development involving
natural disasters in Indonesia. Despite the limitations in the data, we note that aid
encourages nations to invest in their most profitable districts, and that aid may
crowd out workers but helps to build up the infrastructure, invariably leading to
long-term growth. More could be done on this topic, however. Our original
intention was to include more nations in this study, but due to more aid
limitations, we decided to abandon those and focus our efforts on Indonesia. The
major limitation of any similar study will be data availability. The World Bank
has been an amazing source of our data, but even it has limitations. One thing of
note, for the good, is that a vast majority of regions in Indonesia did not record
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data for years before 2007, but have since started to record this data. This will
hopefully make any future endeavors much easier, and much more fruitful.
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Tables
Key of Variables
Variable

Description

GDP_T__H__R

GDP Expenditure of the Tourism, Hotel, and Restaurant industry

GDP_CONS

GDP Expenditure of the Construction industry

MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C

Monthly Per Capita Household Health Expenditure

MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP

Monthly Per Capita Household Education Expenditure

HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP

Household Expenditure per Capita

INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_

Infrastructure Expenditure

ELECTRICITY_RATE

Percentage of people with access to electricity

SAFE_WATER_RATE

Percentage of people with access to safe water

MAJOR_IMPACT

Dummy variable: Did the region suffer a major impact from the
Tsunami

MINOR_IMPACT

Dummy variable: Did the region suffer a minor impact from the
Tsunami

IF_2003/IF_2006/IF_2011

Dummy variable: 1 if the data variable was in 2003/2006/2011
respectively

TIME

1 for 2003; 4 for 2006; 9 for 2011

AID

Net developmental aid to Indonesia

POP

Population
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Table 1

The effects of various figures on Infrastructure Expenditure in 2003
Dependent Variable: LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_)
IF_2003=1
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

12.00948

4.354663

0.0000

LOG(GDP_T__H__R)

0.394660

9.022918

0.0000

LOG(MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP)

-0.206477

-1.336419

0.1823

LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C)

0.054526

0.319138

0.7498

LOG(HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP)

0.702131

2.422940

0.0159

MAJOR_IMPACT

-0.099322

-0.257227

0.7972

MINOR_IMPACT

-0.058942

-0.203887

0.8386

R-squared

0.285273

Adjusted R-squared

0.272078

F-statistic

21.61981

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

Table 2

The effects of various figures and aid on the Poverty Rate
Dependent Variable: POVERTY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

106.0719

4.958019

0.0000

LOG(POP)

0.826795

1.825610

0.0682

LOG(GDP_CONS)

0.953764

3.787234

0.0002

LOG(GDP_T__H__R)

-1.743039

-4.928480

0.0000

LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_)

0.478238

2.028251

0.0428

LOG(HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP)

-12.23986

-9.852943

0.0000

LOG(MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP)

-0.824610

-1.278207

0.2014

LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C)

1.372628

2.197759

0.0282

ELECTRICITY_RATE

-0.179566

-11.87731

0.0000
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MAJOR_IMPACT

5.262932

3.751977

0.0002

MINOR_IMPACT

1.179354

0.937715

0.3486

TIME

1.062493

8.727932

0.0000

LOG(AID)

2.795338

3.890777

0.0001

R-squared

0.500711

Adjusted R-squared

0.494972

F-statistic

87.24772

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

Table 3

The effects of various figures and aid on the Poverty Rate in Minor and No Impact
Regions
Dependent Variable: POVERTY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)
IF MAJOR_IMPACT=0
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

102.2697

4.737089

0.0000

LOG(POP)

1.026116

2.255959

0.0243

LOG(GDP_CONS)

0.997938

3.950466

0.0001

LOG(GDP_T__H__R)

-1.814255

-5.106473

0.0000

LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_)

0.413605

1.739413

0.0822

LOG(HOUSEHOLD_EXP_PER_CAP)

-12.03335

-9.612316

0.0000

LOG(MONTHLY_EDUC_EXP_PER_CAP)

-0.964364

-1.484549

0.1379

LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C)

1.537108

2.456612

0.0142

ELECTRICITY_RATE

-0.182533

-12.06829

0.0000

SAFE_WATER_RATE

0.018251

1.305147

0.1921

TIME

1.055180

8.603451

0.0000

LOG(AID)

2.833101

3.905193

0.0001

R-squared

0.501602

Adjusted R-squared

0.496650

F-statistic

101.2835

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000
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Table 4

The effects of various figures and aid on the Electricity Rate
Dependent Variable: ELECTRICITY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

-101.7571

-2.918969

0.0036

LOG(POP)

-2.003820

-2.535582

0.0114

LOG(GDP_T__H__R)

5.995800

9.372294

0.0000

LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_)

-1.810867

-3.812306

0.0001

LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C)

17.00558

18.04490

0.0000

MAJOR_IMPACT

2.576335

0.647696

0.5173

MINOR_IMPACT

-14.89479

-4.633733

0.0000

IF_2011*MAJOR_IMPACT

8.136850

1.386879

0.1658

IF_2011*MINOR_IMPACT

12.06025

2.185020

0.0291

TIME

-2.662091

-12.73320

0.0000

LOG(AID)

1.934176

1.295407

0.1954

R-squared

0.515075

Adjusted R-squared

0.510813

F-statistic

120.8753

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

30

Table 5

The effects of various figures and aid on the Electricity Rate in Minor and No

Impact Regions
Dependent Variable: ELECTRICITY_RATE (In percent, e.g. 15%=15.0)
IF MAJOR_IMPACT=0
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

Prob.

C

-103.7955

-2.943003

0.0033

LOG(POP)

-1.952606

-2.444519

0.0147

LOG(GDP_T__H__R)

6.094805

9.434019

0.0000

LOG(INFRASTRUCTURE_EXPEND_)

-1.877535

-3.911511

0.0001

LOG(MONTHLY_HEALTH_EXP_PER_C)

17.03720

17.92389

0.0000

MINOR_IMPACT

-15.01326

-4.654181

0.0000

IF_2011*MINOR_IMPACT

12.05335

2.176458

0.0297

TIME

-2.660933

-12.65620

0.0000

LOG(AID)

2.002266

1.325518

0.1853

R-squared

0.519199

Adjusted R-squared

0.515746

F-statistic

150.3706

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

